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Effectiveness and Commitment to Inflation Targeting Policy:  
Evidences from Indonesia and Thailand 
 
Abstract: 
The chief objective of our paper is to highlight basic features of the IT policies adopted by 
Indonesia and Thailand, and to evaluate the commitment of the monetary authorities and the 
overall performances of the IT regime. The results demonstrate that the IT regime in these 
two economies has had some success, but not during the immediate aftermath of the Lehman 
Brothers’ collapse in the last quarter of 2008. Furthermore, the implementations of the IT 
policy in these two Southeast Asian economies have largely been “flexible” during the stable 
period, seeking the balance between narrowing output gap, managing exchange rate 
volatility, and anchoring inflationary pressure. However during the turbulent period, there 
had been a heightened focus in anchoring inflationary expectation.  
  
JEL Classification: E52, E58, F31, F33 
Key Words:  Inflationary Expectation; Output Gap; Inflation Targeting; Pass-
through, Monetary Policy Rule. 
  
 3
1. Introduction 
 Managing price stability, especially for those emerging economies with prohibitive 
vulnerability to sudden shifts in global investor sentiment, is imperative. The efforts to 
achieve this policy objective have been made more complex with unstable commodity prices 
and global financial meltdown, triggered initially by the sub-prime mortgage crisis in the 
United States. A number of policy initiatives have been carried out. To rein in the unwanted 
consequences of volatile capital inflows on the local currency in particular, and on the 
domestic economies in general, most of the major Asian economies were often forced to 
resort to heavy sterilization (Table 1).  However, facing the mounting cost and declining 
effectiveness of the sterilization measures, a number of these countries have gradually 
introduced more flexible regimes of exchange rate and carried out the necessary adjustments 
in their monetary, fiscal, investment and trade policies.  For some emerging markets, the 
adoption of the more flexible exchange rate policy has proven to be an initial step toward the 
full adoption of the inflation targeting (IT) policy as the anchor of their monetary policy in 
particular and their macroeconomic policies in general.  
Two of the most severely affected economies by the 1997 East Asian crisis, namely 
Indonesia and Thailand have officially adopted the IT regime. Although the process and the 
timing varied from one country to another, the needs to abandon the unsustainable rigid 
exchange rate policy and to strengthen the operation, and the effectiveness of the monetary 
policy have been the principal advocates behind the adoption of the IT policy by these two 
major Southeast Asian countries.  
There are two primary objectives of our paper. The first one is to highlight the basic 
features of the IT policies adopted in Indonesia and Thailand, and to evaluate their overall 
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performances, especially during the recent turbulent years. We will first review a number of 
performance indicators such as price stability, growth rate and output volatility. 
Subsequently, our study will examine pass-through effects in both tradable and non-tradable 
prices, and the effectiveness of nominal exchange rate as a shock absorber.  
The second objective is to examine the commitment of the monetary authorities of 
these two major Southeast Asian countries to credibly implement the IT framework. This 
pertinent concern has been frequently debated by past studies, but it has not been fully 
examined. The IT policy is credibly enforced, if the monetary authority is committed to rein 
in inflationary expectation as a primary or one of key objectives of its monetary policy 
reaction function during both stable and volatile economic environments (Schmidt-Hebbel 
and Tapia (2002), and Bernanke and Mishkin (2007)). Prior to 2007, a sustained mild global 
inflation environment induced price stability in general and reduced potential trade-off and 
cost of having low inflation in the local economy. However, uncertainties with global 
economic conditions heightened significantly, particularly since early 2007, posing 
challenges to policy efforts to manage price stability. Hence, it is pertinent to evaluate the 
commitment of these two countries to implement IT policy, and more importantly, to draw 
lessons on the effectiveness of the policy during the past few years of turbulent period.  
Recent studies have been conducted on the above list of issues. Yet, most of these 
early works focused their analyses mainly on the implementation of the IT policy in the 
industrialized economies, and only a few have attempted to examine the implementation of 
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the IT regime in these two economies.1  Our study hopes to fill in the gap in the literature and 
ultimately aims to draw further policy lessons for the other emerging markets around the 
globe.  
This paper proceeds as follows. Next section briefly discusses policy backgrounds 
and basic economic performance indicators under the IT regime.  Section three lays out the 
pass through equation and the monetary policy rule framework to be tested in our study. The 
empirical section introduces the data sets and presents the findings of the autoregressive 
distributed lag (ARDL) for the pass-through effects.  We employ markov-switching approach 
to examine the monetary reaction functions of the central banks. The test results allow us to 
compare and contrast the objectives of the monetary authorities of these two countries during 
the pre and post-IT periods, and thus scrutinize their commitments to implement the IT-
policy. The conclusion section ends the paper. 
      
2. Brief Policy Backgrounds and Primary Performance Indicators  
2.1 Policy Backgrounds 
2.1.1 Indonesia 
Bank Indonesia (BI), the monetary authority of Indonesia, had officially launched its 
IT policy as its new monetary policy framework in July 2005. Under the IT framework, the 
inflation target represents the overriding monetary objective set by the Indonesian 
government after coordination with BI. The authorities have initially allowed the headline 
                                               
1
 Charoenseang, J. & Manakit, P. (2007) and Kubo (2008) have examined the monetary policy 
transmission in Thailand during the IT period. Alamsyah et.al. (2001) discuss issues facing Indonesia 
during preparation stages of the inflation targeting policy. 
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inflation to fluctuate between the range of 9 ± 1% in 2003, before gradually revising the 
headline inflation target downward to 5 ± 1% for 2008 (Table 2).  
Several reasons have been well documented as factors behind the move away from 
the past base money targeting framework to the current IT framework. To start, the 
effectiveness of the base money targeting policy of BI has significantly declined since mid-
1990s, especially during the post-1997 East Asian financial crisis. Boediono (1998) 
underlined two reasons behind this. First is with the open market instrument. The markets for 
the central bank securities/bills (SBIs) and money market paper were relatively thin and 
segmented. The SBIs, in particular, were mostly held by the state banks in mid to late-1990s. 
Second, there were periods of pro-cyclicality of base money. During periods of upswings in 
the economy, rising aggregate demand was accompanied by both increased foreign 
borrowings and liquidation of SBIs, resulting in the excessive rise of money supply. 
In addition, the growing success of international experiences with IT countries in 
reining in inflation without increasing output volatility had also influenced the decision to 
adopt the IT policy in Indonesia (Alamsyah, et.al. (2001)). In particular, the experiences of 
the first group of IT economies, such as New Zealand, Australia and other industrial 
economies, demonstrate that with the rise in the central bank credibility over time, IT policy 
reduces the variability of both inflation and output (Cecchetti and Ehrmann (1999)). 
To boost the effectiveness of monetary policy signals as well as to provide greater 
market certainty, the BI rate is chosen as the interest rate instrument for Bank Indonesia. The 
BI rate is determined during the quarterly or monthly Board of Governors’ meeting, in 
respond to the outlook for the achievement of the inflation target. Moreover, the BI rate is 
used as a reference in the monetary control operations to ensure that the weighted average of 
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1-month Certificate of Bank Indonesia (SBI) rate formed in the Open Market Operations 
(OMOs) auctions remains at around the level of the BI rate.2 Accordingly, the 1-month SBI 
rate is expected to influence interest rates on the interbank money market and longer-term 
interest rates.  
 
2.1.2 Thailand 
The Bank of Thailand (BOT) formally adopted the IT policy in May 2000 after exited 
from the IMF financial assistance programme. Similar to the case of Indonesia, the decision 
to shift from the previous monetary targeting regime to the current IT regime in Thailand was 
largely driven by the recognition that the relationship between monetary indicators and 
output growth had became less stable, especially in the immediate aftermath of the 1997 
financial crisis and under the rapidly changing financial sector in Thailand (Charoenseang 
and Manakit (2007) and Kubo (2008)). In addition, the implementation of IT is needed to 
restore the BOT credibility as well as its independence (Jansen, 2001).  
 Under the IT framework, the quarterly average target of the core inflation (the 
headline inflation excluding raw food and energy prices) has been set at a range of 0-3.5% 
from 2001 onwards (Table 2). The target bandwidth of 3.5% is expected to mitigate 
temporary economic shocks and to minimize the need for the BOT to carry out frequent 
monetary policy adjustments. The BOT sets the 14-day repurchase rate as its policy rate to 
                                               
2
 The monetary control operations take place through the use of the following instruments: (i) Open 
Market Operations (OMOs), (ii) standing facilities; (iii) foreign exchange market intervention, (iv) 
establishment of the minimum statutory reserve requirement, and (v) moral suasion. The most 
important monetary control instrument is the OMOs. BI began issuing its own debt in the form of 
SBI to manage the money supply since 1984. Currently the one-month SBI is auctioned weekly and 
the three-month SBI is auctioned monthly. 
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influence the short-term money market rates, and the monetary authority signals the shifts in 
its policy stance through the announced changes in the key policy rate via the open market 
operations (OMOs)3.  
Looking at data from January 1991 through April 2000, the averages of the core 
inflation and headline inflation in Thailand were relatively identical (McCauley (2006)). The 
maintenance of price stability in terms of core inflation had therefore been expected to lead 
to stable headline inflation (Sriphayak (2001)). The recent episodes of subprime financial 
crisis and soaring prices of key commodities have however challenged this early view on the 
stable relationship between core and headline inflations in Thailand (Figure 1). The average 
gap between the core and headline inflations in the country has not only widened, especially 
since 2005, but it has become less stable as well.4 We will come back to this issue at the 
latter stage of the paper. 
    
2.2 Preliminary Performance Indicators 
A number of basic performance indicators have often been applied to evaluate the 
outcome of the inflation targeting policy. Most have considered the potential trade-offs 
between economic growth and inflation. Cecchetti & Ehrmann (1999) for instance argue that 
one should expect to see heightened levels of output volatility in the IT countries as the 
                                               
3
 In conducting the OMOs, the BOT undertakes transaction in the financial markets to affect the 
aggregate level of reserve balances available in the banking system and thus affects the short-term 
interest rates.  
4
 A commonly used ADF-unit root testing shows that the gap between the core and headline was 
stationary from 1991 to 2002. However it became non-stationary during the period of 2004 to 2008. 
The test result can be made available upon request. 
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monetary authority manipulated the output gap to reverse shocks to inflation. Similarly, 
Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007) examine both the mean and the standard deviation of 
the inflation rate and the GDP growth rate during the pre-and post-IT periods to examine the 
growth and the volatility,  and the potential trade-offs between them. For the IT policy to be 
considered successful, the following outcomes should at least be achieved: 
 
 Lower inflation and output volatility are posted during the post-IT when compared to 
the pre-IT rates. 
 
 The sacrifice ratio (i.e. the output cost of maintaining inflation rate within the targeted 
range) decline over time. 
 
 
Table 3 reports the mean (the growth) and standard deviation (the volatility) of the 
annualized monthly consumer price index (CPI)-based inflation and the annualized quarterly 
GDP growth rate for both economies during the period of two years before )2( −t  and after 
)2( +t the full adoption of the IT policy. Following IMF (2005), two features/conditions must 
be met to be considered under the full-fledged IT period: 
a) The central bank is mandated, and commits to, a unique numerical target in 
the form of a level or a range of annual inflation, and 
b) The inflation forecast over some horizon is the de facto intermediate target of 
the monetary policy. 
Based on those two conditions, the official starting dates of the IT framework in Indonesia 
and Thailand are reported in Table 2. 
 We find several consistent and contrasting findings.  
1.      In general, we found inflation rates in Thailand, but not in Indonesia, to be 
relatively lower and less volatile during two immediate years following the adoption 
of the IT policy than during the pre-IT period. Noted, since the target is the core 
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inflation, Table 3 reports both core and headline inflation for the case of Thailand. 
The high inflation rate at )2( +t  in Indonesia was driven by significant cuts on 
subsidies for a number of feul and its related products in the second quarter of 2005. 
2.      Most encouragingly, there seems to be no trade-off between inflation and 
economic growth. The average GDP growth rates of Indonesia and Thailand during 
)2( +t  have in general been significantly higher and less volatile (smaller standard 
deviations) than the rates during the pre-IT period. 
3.      The headline inflation rates in these two economies had risen significantly in 
recent years. For Indonesia, the mean of the annualized headline inflation had been 
well above the target rate, especially starting the second half of 2008. The rise in the 
key commodity prices in the world market contributed significantly to sudden rise in 
the domestic inflations of the two major Southeast Asian economies.5 From January 
2007 to January 2008, the average headline inflation rate in Indonesia was still 
hovering well within the target of Bank Indonesia, at around 6 percent. The inflation 
rate had however almost doubled during the second half of 2008. 
4.      Despite the rise in the headline inflation, the core inflation rate continued to 
remain well below the inflation target of Bank of Thailand in recent years. There has 
indeed been a mark increase in the core inflation and a significant widening gap 
between the core and the headline inflation, capturing the steep rise in the non-core 
inflation driven by the escalated and volatile commodity prices between 2006 and 
2008 (Figure 1).    
5.      Although the overall growth rates remained strong for the full year of 2008, 
we have seen adverse impacts of the global financial crisis (especially since 
September 2008 with the closure of the Lehman Brothers) and the volatile prices of 
key commodities. The final quarter of 2008 has seen the annualized GDP growth rate 
of Thailand to contract by around 4 percent. The recent experiences with high 
inflation and low growth reconfirm the concern over the effectiveness and superiority 
of inflation target regime over the other monetary regimes during episodes of 
economic turbulences. 
  
                                               
5
 For Indonesia in 2008, three general categories of consumer goods contributed the most to the 
inflation, namely - food; - processed food, beverage and cigarettes and tobbaco; and -housing, water, 
electricity, gas and fuel products. The price of light sweet crude oil at the New York stock exchange 
(NYMEX) for instance was at around US$99 per barrel in early January 2008, before reaching its 
peak at around US$145 per barrel in July of the same year. Similarly, the price of crude palm oil had 
increased by over 40 percent during the first two months of 2008 to US$1,315 per ton.  
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3. Working Model 
3.1. Inflation Inertia and Pass-through Effects 
To further examine the performance of the IT policy, our next task is to examine the 
pass-through effects in these two economies. Has the IT regime reduced the pass-through 
effects and inflation inertia, and therefore contributed to the reported fall in the domestic 
inflation rate of these two economies? Taylor (2000) argues that the extent of a pass-through 
decline is highly influenced by the strong commitment of the monetary authority toward 
price stability. Supporting Taylor’s claim, Gagnon and Ihrig (2004) tested a sample of 
advanced nations and found that the decline in the pass-through has been related to the 
changes in monetary policy procedures, and in particular, to the adoption of inflation 
targeting.  
Edwards (2006), however, demonstrates that “pass-through problem” does not only 
relate to the issue of inflation, but also to the overall effectiveness of the nominal exchange 
rate as a shock absorber. Therefore, the study argues that it is important to make a distinction 
between the pass-throughs of exchange rate changes into the domestic price of non-tradable 
and into the domestic price of tradable. From a policy perspective, a desirable situation is to 
realize a more efficient shock absorbing exchange rate where the pass-through coefficients 
for tradable and non-tradable are low and different, with pass through for tradable goods 
being higher than that for non-tradable goods.  
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To address the set of questions introduced earlier, our study employs the following 
empirical model based on Edwards (2006)6: 
 
Equation 1: 
( )+∆+∆+∆+∆+=∆ ∑∑∑∑
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Where: 
• tP  is a domestic price index –either of tradable or non-tradable. As proxies, the rate of 
change of the CPI is for the non-tradable inflation, and the rate of change for the 
producer price index (PPI) is for the tradable inflation. 
• tE is the nominal effective exchange rate (an increase implies a nominal depreciation 
of the local currency). 
• 
*
tP  is a world price index. The change of this index captures the rate of world 
inflation. The US consumer price index is going to be adopted here as a proxy. 
• DIT is a dummy variable for Inflation Targeting regime. It is equal to zero before the 
adoption of the inflation target in the country, and equals to one otherwise. 
 
Several fundamental assessments can be derived from the regression outcomes on 
Equation 1:  
                                               
6
  This model is the variant of the models introduced by Campa and Goldberg (2002) and Gagnon and 
Ihrig (2004).  
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• The first one is the pre-IT short-run pass through, captured by ∑ 1β . We 
would expect ∑ 1β  to be equal or greater than zero, i.e. a depreciation of the 
nominal effective exchange rate ( )0log >∆ E  would lead to a rise in the 
inflation  ( ),0log >∆ P  and vice versa. 
• The second one is the post-IT short run pass through ( )∑∑ + 41 ββ . If 
( )04 <∑β , the pass through effect for the post-IT period is lower than that of 
the pre-IT. Hence, we find evidence to support Taylor (2000) that a more 
inflationary-focused policy such as IT should reduce pass through. 
• The third one is the pre-IT long-run pass through, estimated as .
1 3
1



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



−∑
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β
β
 
Similar to the short-run pre-IT pass through, we would expect the long-run 
pre-IT pass through to be positive.  
• The next one is the long-run pass through estimates for the post-IT period, 
( )
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 implies that the adoption of the IT policy 
has reduced the long-run pass through effects. 
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• 05 >∑β  suggests that inflation inertia has risen in the local economy. The 
rise (fall) in inflation inertia may contribute as well to the rise (fall) in the 
long-run pass through during the post-IT as compared to the pre-IT period.  
• Lastly,  we will evaluate whether the ratio of the pass-through coefficients for 
the non-tradable price over those of the tradable prices has declined 
(increased), suggesting that the nominal exchange rate is becoming a more 
(less) efficient shock absorber. 
 
3.1.1 Robustness Testing: The Degree of Economic Openness  
Early works, such as Campa and Goldberg (2002), Gagnon and Ihrig (2004), Frankel, 
et.al.(2005) and BIS (2005) among others, have recorded a broad-based decline in the 
exchange rate pass-through (ERPT) during the past two decades. These studies offer a 
number of plausible explanations for the decline in the ERPT, but most of them consistently 
underline the significant contribution of import penetration, international mobility of capital, 
and overall degree of economic openness.  
Given the possibility that the degree of economic openness may have contributed to a 
possible fall in the size of the exchange rate pass-through in our two economies, it is 
therefore warranted to ensure the robustness of our test results that the openness variable is 
added as a control variable in Equation 1:7  
                                               
7
 Investment and Trade reforms in Indonesia and Thailand had taken place rapidly in mid-1980s and 
were followed by aggressive liberalization of the financial sector, particularly in the banking and 
capital market. Both economies shifted away from import-substitution policy to export promotion in 
1980s and committed themselves into both multilateral trade arrangements (such the world trade 
(continued) 
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Equation 2: 
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We construct (Openness) control variable for Indonesia and Thailand. This variable 
would capture the impact of both trade and financial sector reforms on the degree of 
economic openness of the countries. The monthly (Openness) variable is calculated as the 
product of log-normalized values of export ( )tExportln , import ( )tportImln  and market 
capitalization of the stock exchanges ( )tMarketCapln , hence 
( ).ln*Imln*ln tttt MarketCapportExportOpeness = 8  Accordingly, the rate of change in 
the degree of the economic openness is calculated 
as ( ).1−−=∆ ttt OpennessOpennessOpenness   
                                                                                                                                                 
organization (WTO) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)) in 1990s, and bilateral 
trade arrangements with their key trading partners, such as the USA and Japan in 2000s (refer to Sen 
and Rajan (2005) and Kastner and Kim (2008). As an annual percentage of GDP, the average total 
export and import surged from the levels around 36 percent and 53 percent in 1985-1990 in Indonesia 
and Thailand, respectively, to as high as around 45 percent and 118 percent in 2002-2007. Much more 
impressive trends have been demonstrated by the market capitalizations of the stock exchanges in 
these two Southeast Asian nations. The capitalizations of the Jakarta Stock Exchange and the 
Bangkok Stock Exchange were averaging around 0.10 percent and 3 percent per annum of GDP in 
1980-1985, and surged to 30 percent and 67 percent, respectively, in 2002-2007.   
 
8
 Given no monthly official GDP data for both economies, we are not able to calculate the 
composition of the (Openness) control variable as monthly percentages of GDP.    
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As the rise in the degree of the economic openness should reduce the inflationary pressure in 
the local economy, the sign of the coefficient estimate ( )6β  is expected to be negative. 
 
3.2 Monetary Policy Reaction Function Under Inflation Targeting Policy  
Can the decline in the inflation rate and the pass-through effect during the IT period 
be attributed to the full commitment of the monetary authority to the pursuit of the IT policy? 
One way to address this question is by examining the monetary policy rule of the central 
bank during the pre- and the post-IT period. Taylor in his seminal 1993 paper proposes a 
very specific and simple monetary policy rule, where the central bank adjusts its key interest 
rate in a smooth manner responding to the changes in the expected inflation and output gap. 
Furthermore, his study and many others have argued that the domestic monetary policy does 
not systematically respond to external shocks.9 Therefore, exchange rate variable should not 
explicitly be included in the reaction function of the monetary authority. The arguments are 
two folds. First, the exchange rate should already play indirect roles through inflation and 
output variable. Second, adding exchange rate into the policy rule will only place 
considerably more volatility to monetary policy (Taylor, 2001). Mishkin and Schdmit-Hebbel 
(2001) shared this view as well. Likewise, Clarida (2001) contends that even though central 
banks do not target the exchange rate explicitly, the central banks’ objective to stabilize 
inflation will lead to the increase in short-term interest rate when the domestic currency is 
weakening and vice versa. 
                                               
9
 For instance, refer to Corbo, et.al (2001) and Trehan and Wu (2007).  
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Others however challenge the exclusion of the exchange rate in the optimal monetary 
policy rule. Svensson (2000) for instance argues the need to allow for the indirect and direct 
exchange rate transmission channel in the optimal monetary policy reaction function. In his 
1993 seminal paper, Taylor had initially allowed for a significant role of exchange rate factor 
in the policy reaction function of the Federal Reserve Board (FRB). Due to its adverse 
implication on the overall performance of the macroeconomic performance when the FRB 
reacted too strongly to the exchange rate, the study eventually omitted the exchange rate in 
the 1993 rule for the FRB. However, Taylor acknowledges that ‘it is not clear that the same 
conclusion would hold for other countries’ (Taylor (2001)). Note, the importance of 
exchange rate factor has also been underscored in a recent study of Aizenman, et.al. (2008).  
For our study, there are a number of compelling reasons to explicitly account for the 
role of the exchange rate variable in the monetary policy reaction function. To start with, 
external shocks are transmitted largely through exchange rate movements in small open 
economies, such as Indonesia and Thailand. More importantly, the monetary authorities of 
these economies had officially and unofficially adopted rigid exchange rate policy regimes in 
the past. Hence, by including the exchange rate variable, we can examine whether the 
monetary authority continued to place a significant weight on the exchange rate variable 
during the IT-period.  
To test the monetary policy reaction function, we adopt an approach introduced by 
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998), henceforth refer to as the CGG approach:10  
                                               
10
 As briefly mentioned, the CGG approach is often referred to as an augmented version of Taylor 
rule with forward looking expectation on inflation, output and exchange rate gaps (refer to Taylor 
(2001) and Chadha, Sarno and Valente (2004)).  
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( ) t
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n
i
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n
i
ititit qyyEErr εζφpiδ ++−++= ∑∑∑ −−+−−+− *)( 11**  (3) 
 
Where: *tr  is the short-term policy interest rate target; r  is the desired nominal interest 
rate; 1+ttE pi  and 1+tt yE are expected inflation and output for period )1( +t , respectively, 
conditioned on information set available at time )(t ; )( *y is the potential output; 
( )itq − denotes the lagged real exchange rate fluctuation, captured by periodical percentage 
change of real effective exchange rate.11 A positive ( )q  implies a weakening of the local 
currency. δ , φ  and ζ are the parameters determining the central bank’s response to 
deviations of expected inflation from inflation targets, expected output gap and past 
exchange rate volatilities, respectively.  
Early studies have demonstrated that under the forward looking expectation, interest 
rate smoothing behavior, such that tittt rLrr ερρ ++−= −)()1( * , should have a stabilizing 
effect on the monetary policy reaction function (Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) and 
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998)). Incorporating interest rate smoothing into Equation (3) and 
the two above adjustments, the following monetary policy reaction function can be specified: 
 
                                               
11
 Managing volatility of the local currency has indeed been part of critical feature of the IT 
policy in both Indonesia and Thailand (Alamsyah, et.al.(2001) and Charoenseang and 
Manakit (2007)). 
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Where tr  is the current interest rate, ]1,0[∈ρ captures the interest rate smoothing behavior, 
βρδβpiρω )1(*),)(1( −=−−= r , γρφ )1( −=  and λρζ )1( −= . Note: .,...,2,1 ni =   
Equation 4 basically indicates that key central bank interest rate will be determined 
by the past levels of interest rate and exchange rate volatility, and the past and present level 
of expected inflation rate and expected output gap.  Based on the significance and the size of 
the estimate coefficients of φδρ ,,  and ,ζ we can analyze the relative weights of these key 
economic indicators on the monetary policy rule of the country. Theoretically, we would 
expect φδ ,  andζ to be all positive. The rise in the inflation expectation should lead to the 
tightening of the monetary policy. Similarly, rising expected output gap 
*)( 1 yyE itit −−+− should result in stronger inflationary pressure, and therefore requires tighter 
monetary policy stance. Lastly, a positive rise in )(q should trigger stronger imported 
inflation and warrants an upward adjustment in the key interest rate.   
To ensure consistent analyses, we consider the implementation of the IT policy to be 
credible if and only if the expected inflation variable is significant during both regimes. That 
is the forward looking policy to rein in inflation should always be fully enforced under both 
stable and volatile economic conditions. In an extreme case where an IT country places a 
significant weight only on inflation variable, then this country, according to literature, is 
following IT rule.  On the other hand, the implementation of the IT policy would be 
considered a flexible one --following IT framework, when there is a discretionary space for 
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the monetary authority to place more important weights to other factors, such as output 
stability or exchange rate volatilities, than to price stability (Bernanke and Mishkin (2007)).12  
Naturally, if none of the above conditions is met, then IT policy has not been enforced. 
Accordingly, one can argue that other factors, such as more stable macroeconomic 
environment, are largely responsible for the low inflation and the more moderate pass-
through effects. 
 
4. Empirics 
4.1. Data and Date Selection 
Our monthly data series run from January 1990 to December 2008. Most of the raw 
data for prices, key interest rates and exchange rates are sourced from the official websites of 
the central banks of the individual countries and the International Financial Statistics of the 
International Monetary Fund. However, due to the lack of official data, the nominal and real 
effective exchange rates of Indonesia are sourced from the database of JP-Morgan. As 
discussed earlier, we follow IMF (2005) for selecting the starting dates for the official 
implementation of the IT policy.   
All raw variables are in the log-form. The inflation rate is calculated as the monthly 
percentage change in the price levels (consumer price index (CPI) and producer price index 
(PPI)). The monthly industrial production index (IP) for each country is adopted to proxy the 
domestic output, and the growth rate is calculated as the monthly percentage change of the 
                                               
12
 The discretionary to make the necessary adjustment is what Bernanke and Mishkin (2007) consider 
as the advantage of pursuing flexible IT framework. 
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IP. For the key policy rate, we employ the three month-SBI rate for Indonesia and the 14-day 
repurchase rate for Thailand.13    
 
4.2. Autoregressive Distributed Lag Approach for Pass-Through and Inflation Inertia 
 4.2.1 Exponential Smoothing Inflation of Cogley (2002) 
Most studies examining the pass-through effects for developing countries often rely 
on the most common measure of inflation such as the CPI-based or PPI-based rates of 
inflation. However it is well known that there is a substantial presence of transient noises in 
the CPI series of the developing economies, due for instance to the relatively larger shares of 
household expenditures on food and energy products. The volatility of the world prices of 
food and energy commodities, especially since mid-2005, has indeed contributed to the much 
more fluctuated CPI-series in Indonesia and Thailand in recent years. Therefore to enhance 
the quality of our pass through estimates, in addition to the CPI and the PPI based inflation 
series, we also calculate the exponentially smoothed version of the CPI and PPI-based 
inflation series proposed by Cogley (2002).  
Extending the early works of Bryan and Cechetti (1995) and Cecchetti (1997), 
Cogley (2002) proposes a simple adaptive method for filtering inflation data to remove 
transient noise. The study demonstrates that by considering the source of persistent 
movements in inflation, it can further reduce the still relatively high-frequency variation of 
                                               
13
 To reduce the noise and short-run volatilities, we calculate the six-month moving average of the 
exchange rate and the price indices. 
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the transient noise in the inflation series derived from the early approach of Bryan and 
Cechetti (1995).14 
Cogley (2002) develops a core measure of inflation that down-weights distant 
movements in the price index.  The study proposes the following core inflation measure, 
involving the exponential smoothing of current and past aggregate inflation series: 
∑
=
−
−=
0
00 )1(~
j
jt
j
t gg pipi   10 0 << g    (5) 
Where pi denotes the relevant aggregate CPI or PPI-based inflation rates. Equation (5) 
defines the core measure as a one-sided geometric distributed lag of current and past 
inflation. Cogley (2002) sets the gain parameter of 125.00 =g . For our study however, we do 
not predetermine the size of 0g , instead we estimate the smoothing parameter ( 0g ) that will 
minimize the sum of squares of one-step forecast errors.  
Figures 2 and 3 contrast and compare the monthly inflation rates based on the actual 
CPI against that derived by the exponentially smoothing approach of Cogley (2002). Clearly, 
a fair amount of transient noises in the CPI-based inflation rates of Indonesia and Thailand 
has successfully been taken out by the smoothing process.  For the sake of brevity, we do not 
report the exponential smoothed inflation figures based on the PPI series.15 Given these 
                                               
14
 Since the CPI index for each components of the aggregate CPI index is not officially available for 
Indonesia (full data only available starting 2000) and Thailand (only 7 components are available), we 
are not able to calculate the weighted median measure of the aggregate inflation series proposed by 
Brian and Cecchetti (1994) for both of these economies. Moreover, given the adaptive measure of 
Cogley (2002) has been demonstrated to successfully generate less volatile inflation series than the 
approach of  Brian and Cecchetti (1994), we will only employ the former methodology. 
 
15
 However, these figures can be made available upon request.  
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results, the inflation series employed in our pass-through testing will be that of the 
exponentially smoothed series of the tradable and non-tradable inflation series. 
 
4.2.2 Pass-Through Effects 
Early studies have acknowledged that ( )Elog∆  may not be exogenous in Equation 2 
and may very well be correlated with the error term. However, finding an appropriate 
instrumental variable for ( )Elog∆  is difficult.16 One way to circumvent the problem is to 
employ the classical ARDL (Autoregressive Distributed Lag) testing with the general to 
specific approach (Hendry, 1976). This is a common approach adopted by early studies such 
as Campa and Goldberg (2002) and Gagnon and Ihrig (2004). To avoid potential 
endogeneity, the ARDL testing includes variables at period )1( it −− only, with ni ,...,0= .17 
In addition, a crisis dummy is included in the testing to capture potential structural breaks 
due to the financial and exchange rate crisis started in the middle of 1997. Furthermore, a 
battery of test statistics will be reported to ensure that our coefficient estimates are valid and 
robust. 
Prior to conducting the ARDL testing, we test the unit-root properties of each of the 
variables in Equation 2. To anticipate possible presences of structural breaks, we employed 
Banerjee et al. (1992) –henceforth BLS, in addition to standard unit-root tests, i.e. the ADF-
                                               
16
 The difficulty in finding a good instrument for exchange rate variable was initially highlighted by 
Meese and Rogoff (1983). 
17
 Due to the degree of freedom, we start with 5=i  (up to six month lag). In all cases, we do not find 
higher lagged variables to be significant.  
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test, the Phillip Perron test and the KPSS test.18 Depending on the unit-root properties of the 
series, we test for the possible cointegrating relationship among the variables in Equation 2. 
If cointegrating relationship is found, then the error-correction component series 
)( 1−tECM will be included in the ARDL testing.  
  Based on our set of unit-root tests, all relevant series are all found to be non-
stationary and integrated of order 1 at their level ---I(1) series (Table 4).19 Furthermore, 
the ( )tOpenness  variable is also tested to be non-stationary at the level, hence having a 
consistent unit-root property with the rest of the variables in Equation 2. Furthermore, with 
the exception for the case of tradable price of Indonesia, we found weak evidences of 
cointegrating relationship in Equation 2. Accordingly, the error correction component will 
include in the ARDL regression. The pass-through test results are reported in Tables 5 and 
6.20 The R-squares suggest that the explanatory variables can explain in average around 80 
percent of the monthly price changes of tradable and non-tradable goods. The F-statistics 
indicate that one or more of the independent variables are non-zero. In addition, the Breusch-
Godfrey serial correlation LM test statistics confirm that autocorrelations in the residuals are 
not a problem in any of the regressions.  
                                               
18
 The BLS provides a more in-depth investigation of the possibility that aggregate economic time 
series can be characterized as being stationary around ‘a single or multiple structural breaks’. It 
extends the Dickey-Fuller t-test by constructing from the time series of rollingly computed estimators 
and their t-statistics.  Following the BLS procedure, we compute the smallest (minimal) and the 
largest Dickey-Fuller t-statistics. 
 
19
 For the sake of brevity, the results of the standard unit-root tests will not be posted, but they can be 
made available upon request. 
20
 The cointegrating test results, the coefficient estimates for the crisis dummy, and the error 
correction variables from the ARDL regressions are excluded from Table 5. They can however be 
made available upon request.  
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Supporting the claims of Taylor (2000) and Gagnon and Ihrig (2004), our test results 
suggest that the short- and long-run pass-through effects for the non-tradable prices have all 
declined in the post-IT periods in these two economies (Table 6). The rates of changes for 
short-run pass-through ( ( ) ∑∑∑ −+ 141 βββ ) and long-run pass-through effects 
( ( )
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β ) are in the ranges of (-0.067 to -0.129) for Indonesia and 
(-0.016 to -0.048) for Thailand. Similar evidences have been reported as well from the 
tradable price of Thailand, but not for the case of Indonesia.  
The effectiveness of the IT policy in mitigating inflation inertia has also been 
demonstrated in two countries for the case of non-tradable price. Yet, the policy has had 
limited success in anchoring inflation inertia in domestic tradable prices of these two major 
Southeast Asian nations. Inflation inertia (∑ 5β ) for the tradable price has in fact increased 
by about (0.18) and (0.21) for Indonesia and Thailand, respectively, during the post-IT 
period. 
There is also no conclusive evidence that the nominal exchange rate has become more 
efficient shock absorber. As highlighted, the nominal exchange rate is considered to be more 
efficient absorber, if the rates of decline in both short- and long-run pass-through effects of 
the non-tradable prices are larger than those reported for tradable prices. This is not reported 
for the case of Thailand. Similarly, the evidence is at most a weak one for the case of 
Indonesia, as the pass-through effects for the tradable price in Indonesia continued to rise 
during the post-IT period.   
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The overall ARDL test results seem to suggest that the inflation targeting policy in 
Thailand has, in general, shown more favorable outcomes. It is interesting to note however 
that the less encouraging results for the IT policy performance in Indonesia are largely 
consistent with the prevailing stylized facts. To begin, the IT policy has only officially been 
launched in July 2005, about five years later than when it was first initiated in Thailand. 
Furthermore, the IT policy was first implemented during the time when the government of 
Indonesia initiated its gradual reductions of various energy subsidies. The measure has 
successfully alleviated pressures on the current expenditure of the central government 
budget, but at the cost of rising transportation and production costs, and eventually increasing 
the prices of key commodities, including food products, especially during the episodes of 
unprecedented surges in the prices of various energy commodities, between late 2007 to 
middle of 2008. The rise in the non-tradable price has in turn fueled inflationary pressure on 
the overall headline inflation in the country (Table 3).  
 
Robustness Testing: The Role of Openness 
As discussed, to ensure the robustness of our pass-through test results and that the 
pass-through effects have not been over-estimated, we include openness variable in Equation 
2. We find the coefficient estimate of the openness variable ( )tOpenness∆ to be significant 
only for the case of Indonesia (Table 5). The negative coefficient signs seem to support the 
early findings of Campa and Goldberg (2002), Gagnon and Ihrig (2004), Frankel, et.al.(2005) 
and BIS (2005) that the rise in the overall degree of openness should dampen the inflationary 
pressure domestically. 
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It is important to emphasize here however that those previous assessments on the 
degrees of the pass-through effects and inflation inertia, and the roles of IT policy in 
explaining their changes from the pre and post-IT periods have been based on the assumption 
that the monetary authorities of these two countries have indeed been committed in 
implementing the IT policy. This is clearly a brave assumption that needs to be examined, 
and the objective of the next step of our study is to do so.  
 
4.3. Markov-Switching Approach for Monetary Policy Rule 
To compare and contrast the experiences and the shifts in the policy rules under the 
pre- and post-IT periods, past studies, in general, separated the sample observations into two 
sets, the pre- and the post-IT periods based on the pre-determined starting dates of the IT 
policy. This approach however would lead to potential problem with the degree of freedom. 
For the case of Indonesia in particular, we will not be able to carry out any testing for the 
post-crisis period as Indonesia only officially adopted the IT policy in July 2005. By 
breaking the samples into the pre and post-IT groups, we would not have enough degree of 
freedom to carry out any testing for the post-IT period.  To avoid the above shortcomings, we 
will employ the Markov-Switching (MS) regression procedure on Equation 4. The MS-VAR 
does not require us to break the observations into two sample sets as it is designed to pick out 
changes in the generating mechanism of a series. In our case, the changes in the central 
banks’ operating rule will almost for sure affect the stochastic process of the short-term 
interest rate in Equation 4.  
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Furthermore, the dynamic of the interest rate may change from the period of stability 
to that of volatility.21 Understanding the change is critical in our efforts to assess the 
commitment of the central banks in implementing IT policy. As discussed earlier, the 
monetary authority is committed to IT, if and only if they continue to place a significant 
weight on inflation during both stable and turbulent periods. 
 The Markov-switching VAR framework is essentially extending Hamilton's (1989) 
Markov-switching regime framework to the Vector Autoregressive (VAR) systems (see 
Krolzig, 1997; Sims, 1999; Valente, 2003). Our study considers three types of MS-VAR 
models that allows for either regime shifts in intercept term, variance-covariance matrix or 
autoregressive terms. Firstly, we will consider a M-regime p-th order Markov-switching 
VAR that allows for regime shifts in variance-covariance matrix. This model, the Markov-
Switching-Heteroscedastic-VAR or MSH(M)-VAR(p), may be written as follows: 
  ∑
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yAvy tε+       (5) 
Where ty is a K-dimensional observed time-series vector, [ ]′= Ktttt yyy ,...,, 21y  and for this 
paper matrix ty contains all variables used in our monetary policy reaction functions (see 
Equation (3)). v  is a K-dimensional column vector of intercept terms, [ ]′= Kvvv ,...,, 21v ; the 
iA ’s are KK × matrices of autoregressive parameters; tε [ ]′= 1 Kttt εεε ,...,, 2 is a K-
dimensional vector of Gaussian white noise process with a regime-dependent variance-
                                               
21
 To our knowledge, hardly any study has applied the MS-VAR approach to examine the impacts of 
regime shifts on the monetary policy rule. Valente (2003) has examined the monetary policy rules of 
the central banks from 6 OECD economies, namely France, Germany, Italy, UK and USA. 
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covariance matrix ∑ , tε ( ))(,~ tNID s0 ∑ .  The regime-generating process is assumed to be a 
hidden Markov chain with a finite number of states { }Mst ,...,1∈ governed by the transition 
probabilities )|Pr( 1 isjsp ttij === + , and ∑
=
=
M
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1
1 for { }Mji ,...,1, ∈∀ . We can then 
collect all the conditional transition probabilities ijp  into a transition matrix P  as follows: 
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Secondly, we will consider a M-regime p-th order Markov-switching VAR that 
allows for regime shifts in both intercept terms and variance-covariance matrix. The Markov-
Switching-Intercept-Heteroscedastic-VAR or MSIH(M)-VAR(p) may be written as follow: 
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where )(s tv is a K-dimensional column vector of regime-dependent intercept terms, 
[ ]′= )(),...,(),()( 21 tKttt svsvsvsv ; tε ( ))(,~ tNID s0 ∑ as in equation (5),  and { }Mst ,...,1∈ . 
Finally, we will consider a M-regime p-th order Markov-switching VAR that allows 
for regime shifts in all intercept terms, autoregressive parameters and variance-covariance 
matrix. The Markov-Switching-Intercept-Autoregressive Heteroscedastic-VAR or 
MSIAH(M)-VAR(p) can be presented as the following equation: 
   ∑
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where )(s tv is a K-dimensional column vector of regime-dependent intercept terms, 
[ ]′= )(),...,(),()( 21 tKttt svsvsvsv ; the )( ti sA ’s are KK × matrices of regime-dependent 
autoregressive parameters; tε ( ))(,~ tNID s0 ∑  and { }Mst ,...,1∈ .22 
 In short, there are several advantages of adopting the MS-VAR approach to test 
Equation 3.   
• The MS approach allows the coefficient estimates to change over time (time 
variant) in response to possible switches in the policy. Thus, the shifts in the 
parameter estimates of the key variables should reveal any changes in the 
policy commitments and the priorities of the monetary authority during the 
pre-IT and the post-IT periods.  
• The test results disclose the type of regimes (low (stable) and high (volatile) 
regimes) that the IT period falls under, and allow us to analyze whether the 
implementation of the IT only occurs under one particular regime. The period 
of stable regime is the one with smaller standard error. As discussed, the IT 
policy is credible if and only if the role of expected inflation is significant 
under both stable and volatile regimes. That is to say for the policy to be 
credible, the central bank must be committed to address expected inflationary 
pressure under both stable and less conducive economic environment. This 
way we can ensure to some extent that the lower inflation rate is not simply 
due to the economic environment/condition.23 
Prior to conducting the MS-VAR testing, the expected output gap )( *1 yyE tt −+  and  
the expected inflation )( 1+ttE pi variables in Equation 4 have to be estimated. Following 
Valente (2003), the expected rate of inflation can be obtained using a preliminary signal 
extraction procedure. This process would extract the unobservable expected rate of inflation 
                                               
22
 All of the above Markov-switching VAR models will be estimated using the expectation-
maximization (EM) algorithm (see Hamilton, 1989 and Krolzig, 1997). 
23
 The possible association between the economic condition and the commitment to inflation targeting 
has not been addressed by most of the past studies. 
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from the observed rate of inflation by applying the law of iterated projections following the 
Kalman filter technique. Since we are investigating the monetary policy reaction function of 
the Bank of Thailand (BOT) and the Bank of Indonesia (BI), it is only appropriate that we 
extract the expected inflation series from the central banks’ official targeted inflation rates, 
namely the core inflation rate for the BOT and the headline inflation for the BI.  
 To estimate the expected output gap variable, we adopt two stages of estimation: 
• The Hodrick and Prescott (1997) filtering approach is employed to obtain a 
smooth estimate of the long-run trend component of the industrial production (IP) 
index as proxy for output. The gap between the actual IP index and its long-run 
trend component would give us the proxy of the actual output gap at time ).(t     
• Next, we employ the Kalman filtering technique, as described earlier, to estimate 
the expected output gap )( *1 yyE tt −+ . 
For the sake of brevity, the estimates for the expected inflation and the output gap will not be 
reported. 
Dictated by the availability of the continuous monthly key policy interest rate data 
series for Thailand, our MS-VAR testing cover only the period of January 1998 to November 
2008, thus excluding the pre-1997 financial crisis period. As for the Indonesian case, the 
observation period starts from January 1994 to November 2008.  Before conducting the MS-
VAR testing, we evaluate the unit-root properties on all variables in Equation 4.24 We found 
                                               
24
 Here again, we employed four Unit-Root tests: - the BLS; -the standard Augmented Dickey Fuller 
(ADF) test; - the Phillip-Perron test; and – the KPSS test. For the sake of brevity, we do not report the 
results in the paper. 
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that all relevant variables for both economies to be generally stationary at their levels ---(I(0)) 
series.  
Table 7 presents the estimates from the MS-VAR. To incorporate regime shifts in the 
conditional variance, two and three states were estimated. Testing was performed with both 
the normal and the t-distribution, and with different lags based on the Akaike Information 
Criteria (AIC). In order to arrive at the most plausible specification in describing the 
conditional volatility, a bottom-up strategy following Krolzig (1997) was pursued. The 
starting point is to formally test the null hypothesis of no regime switch (m = 1) against the 
alternative of a regime switch (m = 2). If the conventional likelihood ratio test suggests that 
the null hypothesis of no regime switching can, indeed, be rejected, we then proceed to test 
the null hypothesis of two regimes (m = 2) against the alternative of three regimes (m = 3). 25  
On the basis of the set of bottom-up testing, the monetary policy reaction functions (Equation 
4) for these two Southeast Asian countries are adequately characterized as having at most 
two regimes (stable (Regime 1) and volatile (Regime 2)) during the period of observations.26  
In general, we find the significant coefficient estimates to have theoretically 
consistent signs (Table 7). Based on the sizes of the standard errors and the dates listed, it is 
clear that Regime 2 associates predominantly with the periods of economic turbulences 
                                               
25
 A word of caution is necessary in interpreting this result. In Markov switching models, the usual 
regularity conditions justifying the use of classical tests such as the likelihood ratio test are violated. 
This is because, under the null hypothesis of only one state, the transition probabilities are not 
identified, implying that the sample likelihood function is flat with respect to these parameters. As in 
Hamilton and Susmel (1994), the likelihood ratio test results mentioned here should be treated more 
as a descriptive summary than formal statistical tests. The likelihood ratio test statistics can be made 
available upon request. 
26
 We also apply the LR statistics to choose the optimal MS-VAR model, i.e. to test the null of MSH 
and MSIH model against the alternative of the more unrestricted MSIAH model.  
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(Table 8). As expected, the early and peak stages of the 1997 financial crises, covering the 
period of third quarter of 1997 to late 1999 have predominantly fallen under the regime 2. 
For the case of Thailand, a large part of the country’s IT period has taken place during the 
volatile regime, especially since August 2003. In contrast, the IT policy in Indonesia had 
largely benefited from a relatively stable period (Regime 1). Whilst the breakdowns of the 
regimes suggest that the management of the policy rate in Thailand has seen more turbulent 
period during the recent sub-prime crisis, both countries were in Regime 2 during the 
immediate aftermath of the closure of the Lehman Brothers in September 2008.   
Most importantly, our test results provide adequate evidence that managing 
inflationary expectation has indeed been the focus of the monetary policies of these 
economies during both stable and volatile regimes. Hence, there has indeed been a credible 
commitment to the implementation of the IT policy in these two economies. In particular, the 
commitment of Bank of Thailand to pursue the IT policy has withstood a predominantly 
turbulent period.  
We also find that during the stable period (Regime 1), Indonesia and Thailand had 
adopted a flexible approach to the IT policy, or known as IT framework.27 The policy rate has 
been accordingly adjusted to respond to exchange rate volatility, inflationary expectation, 
and expected output gap (Table 7). Interestingly, a greater policy focus has been placed on 
inflationary expectation during the turbulent period.  The test results seem to suggest that 
during the volatile period, the output gap did not significantly influence the interest rate 
policy of both Bank Indonesia and Bank of Thailand. In the case of Thailand, the monetary 
                                               
27
 This finding supports that of Alamsyah, et.al. (2001) and Kubo (2008). 
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authority shifted to a full IT rule from IT framework during Regime 2. As for Indonesia, 
managing exchange rate volatility continued to be one of the objectives of the interest rate 
policy, in addition to anchoring inflationary expectation. This finding on the importance of 
the management of exchange rate volatility supports the official statement of Bank Indonesia 
on its IT policy implementation framework (Alamsyah, et.al. (2001)).  
In summary, a credible and flexible commitment to IT framework is evident in the 
cases of Indonesia and Thailand. Both Bank of Indonesia and Bank of Thailand pursued a 
forward looking policy to manage price, exchange rate volatilities, and output gaps. The 
country’s monetary authorities were steadfast on anchoring inflationary expectation, 
especially during the Regime 2. During a more stable period, the IT policy was adjusted to 
aim at balancing inflation, exchange rate volatilities, and output stabilities (Table 7).  
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
A series of initiatives have been proposed and implemented by the Asian 
governments to prevent the repeat of the 1997 financial crises in their economies. Deepening 
of the bond market is another important step taken to reduce reliance on bank financing. 
Recent years have also seen impressive growths in the net foreign asset holdings of the Asian 
economies.  In addition to the strengthening of the key financial institutions and reducing 
potential vulnerabilities of the financial sector, there is a growing consensus among the 
policy makers and academics in general that consistent macroeconomic policy frameworks 
must be in place. In pursue of credible anchor of monetary policy, maintaining price stability, 
either as explicit or implicit nominal anchor of the monetary policy framework, has clearly 
gained popularity in the last decade. Prior to the outbreak of the 1997 East Asian financial 
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crises, none of the Asian economies adopted the IT policy. In fact, in total only five 
developed economies have officially announced their inflation targets before 1997. By end of 
2006, 24 economies have inflation targeting as the official policy objective of their monetary 
authorities, and more than half of these economies are from the emerging markets.  
Our paper has examined the implementation and the performance of the IT policy in 
Indonesia and Thailand. We conducted in-depth analyses on the pass-through effects, both 
for non-tradable and tradable prices in the local economy. In addition, the markov-switching 
approach is employed to test for the shift in the monetary policy rule of the monetary 
authorities during the pre-and post-IT periods. In general, these economies have seen their 
inflation rates to fall during the post-IT period. The pass-through effects in these economies 
have in general declined considerably, except for the tradable price of Indonesia.  
Furthermore, we find robust evidence of credible implementation of the IT policy these two 
economies during both stable and volatile period. While Indonesia continued with its flexible 
IT framework, Thailand shifted to strict IT rule during the turbulent period. 
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Table 1:  
Sterilization Coefficients a,b 
 2000-2007 2000-2002 2003-2004 2005-2007 
India -0.79* -0.72* -1.00* -0.72* 
Indonesia -0.82* -0.85* -0.79* -0.77* 
Korea -1.00* -0.93* -1.02* -1.06* 
Philippines -0.85* -0.72* -0.92* -1.15* 
Thailand -0.87 -0.91* -0.69 -0.90* 
 
Source: Asia Pacific Regional Economic Outlook, IMF, October 2007. 
a
 The sterilization coefficient is the coefficient from a regression on the contribution of net domestic assets to reserve money 
growth on the contribution of net foreign assets to reserve money growth. Net domestic assets in the regression are defined as 
reserve money minus net foreign assets. 
  
b
 An asterik denotes that the null hypothesis of full sterilization (a coefficient equal to or smaller than -1) cannot be rejected at the 
95 percent confidence level. 
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Table 2:  
Implementation and Design of Inflation Targeting Framework 
 
Country Date  
Introduced 
Target 
Price 
Index  
Inflation Target 
Level 
Target 
Horizon 
Policy/ 
Official 
Interest 
Rate 
Target Set 
By 
Escape Clauses Accountability 
of Target 
Misses 
Publication and 
Transparency 
Indonesia July 2005 
 
 
CPI 2000: 3 – 5%  
2001: 4 – 6% 
2002: 9 – 10% 
2003: 9% ( ± 1%) 
2004: 5.5 % 
( ± 1%) 
2005: 6% ( ± 1%) 
2006: 8% ( ± 1%) 
2007: 6% ( ± 1%)  
2008: 5% ( ± 1%) 
 
Indefinite  1-month SBI 
(Certificate 
of Bank 
Indonesia) 
rate 
Government 
in 
consultation 
with Central 
Bank (CB) 
None None, but the 
House of 
Representatives 
can request 
progress report 
at any time. 
Periodically publications 
of: 
 Weekly Report 
 Monthly Indonesian 
Financial and 
Economic Statistics 
 Monthly Review of 
Monetary Policy 
 Quarterly Monetary 
and Economic 
Progress 
 Quarterly Report on 
Monetary Policy 
Progress 
 Annual Report 
 
Thailand May 2000 Core 
CPIa 
Since 2000: 0 – 
3.5% 
 
Indefinite  14-day 
repurchase 
rate 
Government 
in 
consultation  
with CB 
None Public 
explanation of 
target breach 
and measures 
taken as well as 
time required 
to bring 
inflation within 
the target 
 Publication of 
inflation report. 
 Publication of 
inflation projections. 
 Publication of the 
minutes of monetary 
policy meetings. 
Note: 
a) Thailand core CPI is defined as CPI excluding raw food and energy prices. 
 
Sources: Compiled by authors from the Bank Indonesia and the Bank of Thailand  web-pages, Mishkin & Schmidt-Hebbel (2001), Ho & McCauley (2003) 
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Table 3: Pre- and Post-IT Headline Inflation and GDP Growth Rates at )2( −t  to )2( +t 1 
(Mean and Standard Deviation)2 
 Inflation at  
)2( −t  
Inflation at 
)2( +t  
Inflation 
January 2006 
–  
December 
2008 
GDP Growth 
rate )2( −t  
GDP Growth 
rate )2( +t  
GDP Growth 
Rate  
q1, 2006 – 
q4, 2008 
Official 
Starting Dates 
of IT 
Framework 
 
Indonesia 6.5 *)02.1(±  11.74 *)99.4(±   9.91 *)04.4(±   5.07 *)91.0(±  5.65 *)52.0(±  5.94 *)58.0(±  July 2005 
Thailand Headline: 
2.81 *)82.3(±  
 
Core: 
3.28 *)98.2(±  
 
Headline: 
1.51 *)75.0(±  
 
Core: 
1.01 *)36.0(±  
 
Headline: 
4.13 *)17.2(±  
 
Core: 
1.89 *)81.0(±  
-1.94 *)80.8(±  3.41 *)54.1(±  4.29 *)77.2(±  May 2000 
 
1/  )2( −t  denotes two years prior to the adoption of inflation targeting framework and )2( +t implies two years after the adoption 
of IT framework. 
2/ Mean for inflation is calculated as the monthly average of year on year inflation  











 −
=∆
−
− 100*
12
12
t
tt
CPI
CPICPI
p . The mean for 
GDP growth rate is the average of the annualized quarterly GDP growth rate 












−
=∆
−
− 100*
4
4
t
tt
GDP
GDPGDPGDP . Note: GDP is in 
local currency at constant market price. 
* The numbers inside (  ) are the standard deviation.
  
Table 4: BLS-rolling unit-root test results 
 
 Indonesia Thailand 
 
Non-tradable max
DFt
)
 
min
DFt
)
 
max
DFt
)
 
min
DFt
)
 
tPlog  -0.55 -2.25 -0.31 -2.51 
tPlog∆  -2.76 -4.92 -7.67 -45.27 
 
    
Tradable     
tPlog  1.17 -1.81 -0.39 -1.03 
tPlog∆  -7.38 -16.69 -5.32 -13.26 
 
    
Other Key 
Variables 
    
*log tP  0.43 -0.01 -0.04 -2.02 
*log tP∆  -7.58 -9.37 -7.58 -9.37 
tElog  -0.67 -2.13 -1.17 -3.63 
tElog∆  -3.22 -4.69 -3.13 -4.90 
tOpennesslog  1.31 -0.96 0.63 -1.17 
tOpennesslog∆  -2.21 -4.90 -1.50 -4.60* 
 
 
Notes: Critical value for the maximal DF statistics at 5 percent level for total observation set 
of around 250 (or less) is (-1.48) and critical value for the minimal DF statistics at 5 percent 
for the same set of observation is (-4.85). Our total observation set is around 220.*/ minDFt
)
 is 
lower than the critical value for the minimal DF statistics at 10 percent. 
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Table 5: Pass-Through Effects  
 
 
Indonesia 
(CPI) 
Indonesia 
(PPI) 
Thailand 
(CPI) 
Thailand 
(PPI) 
 
Constant -0.218 (-5.173)*** 0.004 (5.299)*** 0.011 (2.109)** -0.034 (-2.444)** 
 
1log −∆ tE  (---) 0.323 (11.575)*** (---) 0.223 (4.992)*** 
2log −∆ tE  0.069 (4.128)*** -0.194 (-5.033)*** (---) (---) 
3log −∆ tE  (---) (---) (---) -0.232 (-2.629)*** 
4log −∆ tE  (---) 0.090 (3.692)*** 0.021 (2.721)*** 0.167 (2.307)** 
*
1log −∆ tP  (---) (---) (---) (---) 
*
2log −∆ tP  (---) (---) (---) (---) 
*
3log −∆ tP  (---) (---) (---) (---) 
*
4log −∆ tP  (---) (---) (---) -0.129 (-1.745)* 
1log −∆ tP  0.818 (10.484)*** 0.888 (12.823)*** 0.972 (13.447)*** 0.833 (8.897)*** 
2log −∆ tP  -0.345 (-5.059)*** -0.389 (-5.766)*** -0.206 (-2.992)*** -0.366 (-5.228)*** 
3log −∆ tP  (---) (---) (---) (---) 
4log −∆ tP  (---) (---) (---) (---) 
DITEt *log 1−∆  -0.469 (-3.304)*** (---) 0.067 (2.257)** 0.386 (2.088)** 
DITEt *log 2−∆  0.402 (2.524)** (---) (---) -0.626 (-3.387)*** 
DITEt *log 3−∆  (---) (---) -0.188 (-3.428)*** (---) 
DITEt *log 4−∆  (---) (---) 0.105 (2.319)** (---) 
DITPt *log 1−∆  -0.394 (-2.826)*** (---) (---) 0.206 (2.085)** 
DITPt *log 2−∆  0.255 (1.820)* 0.573 (4.258)*** (---) (---) 
DITPt *log 3−∆  (---) -0.685 (-3.692)*** (---) (---) 
DITPt *log 4−∆  -0.248 (-2.115)** 0.295 (2.303)*** -0.129 (-2.962)*** (---) 
∆Openness(t-1) -0.0002 (-3.089)*** -0.0001 (-1.685)* (---) (---) 
∆Openness(t-2) (---) (---) (---) (---) 
∆Openness(t-3) (---) (---) (---) (---) 
∆Openness(t-4) (---) (---) (---) (---) 
Adj R-squared 0.860 0.884 0.784 0.674 
Prob (LM-test) 0.119 0.395 0.258 0.633 
Prob (F-stat) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Note: (---) implies not significant, hence excluded from the final test;  
(  ) t-statistics; */10% significant; **/5% significant; ***/1% significant 
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Table 6: Summary of Impact of IT on the Pass-Through Effects (1) 
 
 
 
 
 IT Impact on  
Short-Run  
Pass-Through  
IT Impact on  
Long-Run  
Pass-Through  
Inflation 
Inertia 
  ( ) ∑∑∑ −+ 141 βββ  
 
 
( )





+−
+
∑∑
∑∑
53
41
1 ββ
ββ
- .
1 3
1








−∑
∑
β
β
 
 
∑ 5β  
 
1. Non-
Tradable 
   
 
     Indonesia 
 
-0.067 
 
-0.129 
 
-0.387 
 
     Thailand 
 
-0.016 
 
-0.048 
 
-0.129 
 
   
 
2. Tradable 
 
 
  
 
     Indonesia 
 
0.000 
 
0.251 
 
0.183 
 
     Thailand 
 
-0.240 
 
-0.547 
 
0.206 
 
 
Note: 
1/ (-) indicates that IT has managed to reduce the pass-through effects and inflation inertia.
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Table 7: the MS-VAR Test Results 
 
 Indonesia (Headline) 
MSIAH(2,2) 
(January 1994 – 
November 2008) 
Thailand (Core) 
MSIAH(2,3) 
(Jan 1998 - 
November 2008) 
 
 Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 1 Regime 2 
 
Constant -0.232 
(-2.403)** 
3.265 
(2.569)** 
-0.197 
(-12.816)*** 
-0.003 
(-0.548) 
1−tr  1.161 (33.444)*** 
0.986 
(5.901)*** 
0.254 
(2.655)** 
0.167 
(2.672)*** 
rt-2 -0.162 
(-5.376)*** 
-0.209 
(-1.522) 
-0.128 
(-1.149) 
0.035 
(0.565) 
3−tr  ---- ---- -1.267 (-9.789)*** 
0.122 
(2.343)** 
1−tq  -0.099 (-0.170) 
11.769 
(2.235)** 
-1.015 
(-4.247)*** 
-0.027 
(-0.079) 
2−tq  3.672 (4.734)*** 
14.892 
(2.911)*** 
1.707 
(8.269)*** 
-0.077 
(-0.192) 
3−tq  ---- ---- 0.407 (1.489) 
-0.168 
(-0.535) 
ttE pi1−  28.645 (5.589)*** 
-5.822 
(-0.062) 
39.636 
(8.421)*** 
1.967 
(0.466) 
12 −− ttE pi  16.182 (2.571)*** 
239.06 
(3.529)*** 
-14.266 
(-3.449)*** 
13.188 
(2.811)*** 
23 −− ttE pi  ---- ---- 21.339 (5.622) 
-1.887 
(-0.438) 
*1 yyE tt −−  0.025 (1.737)* 
0.030 
(0.105) 
-0.006 
(-1.377) 
0.0002 
(0.084) 
*12 yyE tt −−−  -0.024 (-1.868)* 
-0.239 
(-0.914) 
-0.010 
(-2.137)** 
-0.001 
(-1.121) 
*23 yyE tt −−−  ---- ---- 0.091 (-17.938)*** 
0.0006 
( 0.487) 
Std Error 0.367 2.546 0.032 0.046 
 
 
Note:  The numbers inside ( ) are the t-statistics. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 
5% and 10% respectively. T-test critical values: at 1% = 2.66; at 5%=2.00 and at 10% =1.67. 
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Table 8: MS-VAR Stable and Volatile Regimes 
 
 
 Indonesia Thailand 
 
Regime 1: Stable Period  
 
 
1994:1 - 1997:7 
1997:11 - 1997:11 
1998:2 – 1998:3 
1999:1 – 1999:3 
1999:8 – 1999:8 
2000:1 – 2000:6 
2000:9 – 2001:6 
2001:11 - 2005:9 
2005:11 - 2008:9 
 
 
1998:2 - 1998:5 
1998:7 – 1998:12 
1999:3 – 1999:4 
2001:6 – 2001:6 
2003:7 – 2003:7 
 
 
Regime 2: Volatile Period 
 
 
1997:8 – 1997:10 
1997:12 – 1998:1 
1998:4 – 1998:12 
1999:4 – 1999:7 
1999:9 – 1999:12 
2000:7 – 2000:8 
2001:7 – 2001:10 
2005:10 – 2005:10 
2008:10 – 2008:11 
 
 
1998:1 - 1998:1 
1998:6 – 1998:6 
1999:1 - 1999:2 
1999:5 – 2001:5 
2001:7 - 2003:6 
2003:8 – 2008:7 
2008:8 – 2008:11 
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Figure 1: Year on Year Core and Headline Inflations of Thailand 
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Figure 2: Monthly CPI based Inflation in Indonesia ( )1lnln −− tt PP  
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Figure 3: Monthly CPI based Inflation in Thailand ( )1lnln −− tt PP  
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